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In a famous letter to Henry Lee, written on May 8, 1825, almost fifty 
years after the signing of the American Declaration of Independence, 
Thomas Jefferson gave his most extensive and reflective account of his 
great handiwork. By way of response to a published remark of Timothy 
Pickering that the Declaration did not contain an idea "but what had 
been hackneyed in Congress two years before", Jefferson wrote: 
"But with respect to our rights, and the acts of the British government con-
travening those rights, there was but one opinion on this side of t,he water. 
All American Whigs thought alike on these subjects. When forced, there-
fore, to resort to arms for redress, an appeal to the tribunal of the world was 
deemed proper for our justification. This was the object of the Declaration 
of Independence. Not to find out new principles, or new arguments, never 
before thought of, not merely to say things wich had never been said before; 
but to place before mankind the common sense of the subject, in terms so 
plain and firm as to command their assent, and to justify ourselves in the 
independent stand we are compelled to take". 
This common sense reflected, however, the political education that had 
been underway in America at least since the seeds of Revolution had been 
sown in the early 1760s. Jefferson explained further: 
"Neither aiming at originality of principle or sentiment, nor yet copied from 
any particular and previous writing, it was intended to be an expression of 
the American mind, and to give to that expression the proper tone and spirit 
called for by the occasion. All its authority rests then on the harmonizing 
sentiments of the day, whether expressed in conversation, in letters, printed 
essays, or in the elementary books of public right, as Aristotle, Cicero, 
Locke, Sidney, etc" ( 1 ). 
According to the principal author of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, then, its principles were neither wholly ancient nor wholly modem 
but a commonsensical combination of the two, prudently adapted to the 
circumstances of Revolutionary America. To Jefferson and the other 
(1) Merrill D. Peterson, ed., Thomas Jefferson: Writings, New York: Library 
of America, 1984, 1501. 
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members of the Continental Congress, there was a broad area of reason-
able agreement on the subject of" public right" among ancients and mod-
ems, among "Aristotle, Cicero, Locke, Sidney" - to name a few. 
Whereas recent scholars have emphasized the differences between an-
cients and modems, and tried to interpret the American Founding in that 
light, the Declaration's signers did not seem to think such distinctions rel-
evant at the level of elementary political right. They did not read John 
Locke, for example, with the subtlety that certain contemporary scholars 
do; or perhaps they read him with a different purpose in mind, with a 
practical rather than a theoretical end in view, in the light of Sidney rath-
er than of Hobbes (2). 
If so, one would expect that the distinction between ancient natural 
law or natural right philosophy, on the one hand, and modem natural 
rights philosophy, on the other, would not have the commanding impor-
tance for the Declaration - and for America - that it has assumed in 
recent interpretations of both. In that case, Locke's frequent quotations 
from Richard Hooker would have a different bearing. Along with Sid-
ney's glowing tributes to Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero, they would describe 
a road leading backwards to the ancients, fraught with hazards, obstacles, 
and detours, no doubt, but nonetheless connecting the practical politics of 
ancient and modem republicanism on certain fundamental points. Not 
that this is an argument that must lean for support on the thin reed of 
Locke's and Sidney's quotations. On the contrary, the overall connection 
between their politics and that of the ancients can be seen in the very idea 
of republicanism, which may in a latitudinarian sense be defined as gov-
ernment in which there is liberty (the people participate in rule, and the 
public good is the object of deliberations that are to some degree public) 
and the rule of law (3). In this sense, the term includes constitutional 
democracies as well as free, mixed regimes; but it definitely excludes 
absolute, hereditary, ecclesiastical monarchy or any tyrannical approxima-
tion thereto. 
Another way to look at the connection between America and the 
ancients (including Cicero) is to begin from the rule of law as primarily a 
constitutional rather than a republican notion. In the United States the 
two are not frequently distinguished because our Constitution is republi-
can; but there still exists a tension between the rule of law in the more 
(2) See Charles R. Kesler, The Founders and the Classics, in James W. Mull-
er, ed., The Revival of Constitutionalism, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press 
1988, 43-68. 
(3) Cf. James Wilson, Lectures on Law, in The Works of James Wilson, Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press 1967, ed. Robert Green McCloskey, vol: 1, 69-
72. 
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popular sense of ruling and being ruled in turn, that is, having to live 
under the same law that one makes, and the more formal sense of the law 
itself as the fundamental ruler which means, in the American case, 
acknowledging the authority of the Constitution as the fundamental law, 
or as the attempted embodiment of the "higher law". It is the latter 
interpretation that came to the fore in the school of thought deriving from 
the learned and influential writings of Edward S. Corwin. In his classic 
little book on The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional 
Law, Corwin traced the American people's respect for their Constitution 
not to the fact that it was they (i.e., their ancestors) who had ordained and 
established it, but primarily to the idea that the Constitution was an "em-
bodiment of an essential and unchanging justice". As predicated of con-
stitutions in general, but of the American Constitution in particular, this 
idea could be elaborated as follows. In Corwin's words: 
"There are ... certain principles of right and justice which are entitled to 
prevail of their own intrinsic excellence, altogether regardless of the attitude 
of those who wield the physical resources of the community. Suc)l princi-
ples were made by no human hands; indeed, if they did not antedate deity 
itself, they still so express its nature as to bind and control it. They are 
external to all Will as such and interpenetrate all Reason as such. They are 
eternal and immutable. In relation to such principles, human laws are, 
when entitled to obedience save as to matters indifferent, merely a record or 
transcript, and their enactment an act not of will or power but one of discov-
ery and declaration" ( 4). 
We might apply this admirable description to the American case by 
saying that the Constitution is, or used to be, thought to embody the prin-
ciples of the Declaration oflndependence- the "Laws of Nature and of 
nature's God" and the "unalienable Rights" claimed under those laws. 
Respect for the Constitution was therefore understood to be part of obe-
dience to the natural law, to the fundamental rules of justice ordaining, 
moderating, and limiting .majority rule. This view has been subject to 
more or less systematic intellectual attack for the past hundred years, but 
it remains the basis for most Americans' veneration of their Constitution. 
To judge whether it is defensible, we must reconsider not only the Ameri-
can political tradition but the natural law doctrine that is its heart. We 
have seen that Jefferson traced the intellectual provenance of the Declara-
tion to (among others) Cicero; and a great scholar of the Constitution, 
Edward Corwin, has argued that the "rationalistic" or "Ciceronian" 
(4) EdwardS. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitu-
tional Law, Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1955, 4-5. The book was originally 
published as an essay in the "Harvard Law Review" 42, 1928-29, 149-185 and 
365-409. 
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definition of naturai law formed the principal strand of the "higher law 
background" of American constitutionalism. To help clarify America's 
relation to the natural law tradition, then, let us return to the intellectual 
and moral "common sense of the subject" (to borrow Jefferson's lan-
guage) in the books of Cicero. 
Cicero was the first political philosopher to speak of the natural law 
in a sustained and thematic way, indeed to make it central to his philo-
sophical writings on politics. Yet this fact is so far from being appre-
ciated that its significance has hardly registered on contemporary scholars. 
On the one hand, those who try to study the history of political philoso-
phy in a non-historicist way tend to concentrate on Plato and Aristotle 
(not without reason), and often to assimilate the two into a generic prod-
uct called "classical political philosophy". Cicero figures in, if not as a 
base metal, then at least as the third and least precious metal composing 
this alloy. On the other hand, those researchers who proceed from his-
toricist premises simply identify Cicero's thought with his times, with his 
Romanness, with the typical political and intellectual confusions of his 
age. In doing so, of course, they repeat the regnant intellectual confusion 
of our age, a thought that does not seem to trouble them, perhaps because 
it has not occurred to them. 
In what follows I shall try to avoid these pitfalls by focusing squarely 
on the natural law teaching that is so prominent in Cicero's works and 
that is, on the surface, so different from Plato's and Aristotle's accounts of 
justice. More precisely, I focus on the public character of right in Cice-
ro's political philosophy - the forthright enunciation of true or natural 
laws that every city ought to obey. 
Why then does Cicero turn to the natural law doctrine? Knowing 
full well the natural right teachings of Plato and Aristotle, why does he 
depart from them to articulate the character of natural justice in this new 
way, or at least with this new emphasis? (Even if, as is often asserted, 
natural law were a Stoic commonplace, the vital question would remain, 
Why did Cicero choose to follow this purported Stoic tradition rather 
than the Academic or Peripatetic?) At least part of the answer centers on 
disagreements between Cicero and Plato and Aristotle on the status of 
politics, the self-sufficiency of moral virtue, and, more generally, the role 
that political philosophy ought to play in political life. These disagree-
ments take place on the level of political philosophy, that is, within the 
tradition of the Socratic approach to politics; so there is not a radical 
break with Plato and Aristotle. In general, however, Cicero believes that 
political life needs more guidance from political philosophy, or at least 
more direct and visible guidance, than either Plato or Aristotle allowed. 
In this paper I cannot present a thoro:ugh interpretation of the texts 
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on which . I. base my answer, but. I can sketch briefly the arguments in 
Cicero's principal writings on the natural law as they bear on the ques-
tion. 
First, concerning his differences with Plato and Aristotle. To repeat, 
Cicero considered himself to be in broad agreement with the political phi-
losophy of the Socratic schools. But Cicero more particularly considered 
himself to be an Academic Skeptic, that is to say, an adherent of the skep-
tical New Academy, which held that the truth of any perception was only 
more or less probable. The New Academy rejected what it considered 
the dogmatism of Stoicism, Epicureanism, and the Old Academy, i.e., 
Plato's Academy. The dogmatism of the Old Academy consisted in the 
doctrine of the ideas and of infallible perceptions (a notion considerably 
developed by the Stoics in their account of the Wise Man) based on the 
ideas. It should perhaps be noted that in opposing the dogmatism of the 
ideas, the New Academy may have been more faithful to Plato than were 
his students in the Old Academy, inasmuch as Plato makes clear in the 
image of the divided line that our perceptions of visible and intelligible 
things cannot escape relying on pistis, that is, faith or trust, which as such 
is always open to skeptical attack. 
At any rate, Cicero's Republic is, so to speak; conspicuously lacking 
in ideas. But it does present us with the striking story of two suns having 
been seen in the sky. Plato in his Republic had also discussed two suns, 
the visible sun, the cause of seeing, and the sun as an image of the idea of 
the good, which is the cause of intellection and hence of being. Cicero 
does not, however, call one of his suns an image; the second sun is an 
unexplained celestial phenomenon. In Cicero, the two suns are a cause of 
confusion or doubt, not certain understanding. If there are two suns in 
the sky, other things being equal, how can we know which one of them is 
real, or whether either one of them is real (5)? 
We could know the answer only if it were possible to distinguish true 
from false perceptions exactly, and if we were able to rule out the possibil-
ity of miracles, of unexplained and unexplainable phenomena. But this is 
precisely what Cicero, as an adherent of the New Academy, denies to be 
possible. Without an infallible way to ascertain which is the true percep-
tion, we are left to use probability as our only guide (6). The determina-
tion of probabilites is, however, an essential part of prudential reasoning, 
and therefore belongs as much - ifnot more - to the work of the states-
man as to the activity of the philosopher. The superiority of the philo-
sophic life, which in Plato's Republic seems to depend fmally on the intel-
12 
(5) Consider Academica II, 80, 82, 123, and esp. 127-128. 
(6) See Academica II, 40-42, 77-78, 80-90, 99-104. 
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ligibility of the ideas and the majesty of the idea of the good, is called into 
question in Cicero's Republic by the fact that our access to the things that 
are is in every case only more or less probable. 
Whatever the answer, it is clear that Cicero is intent on elevating the 
dignity of politics as much as possible. Thus the characters in his dialo-
gues are eminent men of Rome - consuls, generals, senators, lawyers -
not the sort of demimondaine crowd that surrounds Socrates in Plato's 
dialogues. In particular, his depiction of the circle around the great Sci-
pio African us shows the possibility of philosophically-inclined statesman-
ship in a way that neither Plato nor Aristotle had done, despite their 
efforts to educate sympathetic gentlemen and even a tyrant or two. In 
fact, the learned statesmen of Cicero provide a kind of model of educated 
public men: an example that made intelligible and brought to life the 
kind of human excellence to which Renaissance gentlemen later aspired, 
and with which the American Founding was notably graced. 
To be sure, Cicero does not promise that evils will cease in the cities 
of men when cultivated gentlemen rule. What he argues is that political 
life will be better if gentlemen rule who are steeped in the natural law 
doctrine. Why is gentlemanship per se not sufficient? This had been 
Aristotle's basic solution to the political problem, after all. Aristotle had 
tried to show that the realm of moral virtue or gentlemanship was self-
sufficient; he separated moral from intellectual virtue in part to preserve 
the gentleman's prejudices against the philosopher's radical questioning. 
But Aristotle was aware that moral virtue, the gentleman's virtue, could 
not be made completely self-sufficient: it depended on prudence for its 
proper exercise and guidance, and prudence is an intellectual virtue; and 
it depended on praise and blame, on the honor conferred by gentlemen 
and the people, both for the training of young gentlemen and for the glory 
and renown of mature ones. At top and at bottom, then, moral virtue 
was exposed to certain dangers: to appropriation or misdirection by false 
philosophy at the top, to the debased honors of a corrupt country at the 
bottom. These are the dangers Cicero attempts to meet by supplement-
ing and correcting gentlemanship with the natural law doctrine. 
In one respect, then, Cicero's use of the natural law is eminently Pla-
tonic, for the natural law is a philosophical correction to the habitual vir-
tue of the gentleman; it restores, to some extent, the equation of virtue 
with knowledge. In another respect, however, it is not Platonic, at least if 
we confine our concern to the Plato of the Republic, for as a supplement 
to moral virtue it denies that philosophers must rule directly to bring 
about justice in the city. Instead, philosophers can rule indirectly through 
the promulgation, as it were, of the natural law. This quasi-Platonic 
emendation of Aristotle thus recognizes that Aristotle was basically right 
CICERO AND THE NATURAL LAW TRADITION IN AMERICA 179 
in distinguishing gentlemanly virtue, based on habit, from philosophical 
virtue, characterized by continual questioning. But Cicero insists that to 
the habits of soul forming the virtues (as Aristotle described them) has to 
be added a habitus of practical principles. Neither rule by philosophers 
nor rule by gentlemen was a sufficiently reliable solution to political prob-
lems. 
If one were to compare Cicero's Republic to Plato's, perhaps the most 
striking difference is how keen Cicero is to convince his readers of the 
dignity and urgency of politics. To be sure, he does not disagree with 
Plato about the tediousness, distastefulness, and danger of much of politi-
. cal life; and in part he wishes to moderate political ambition and passion 
for sound Platonic reasons. But he is impressed perhaps more than was 
Plato with the dangers that philosophy itself poses to decent politics. 
Philosophy in Cicero's day was increasing unpolitical and even antipoliti-
cal. Epicureanism threatened to discredit politics as unpleasant and 
hence foolish, Stoicism to belittle it as beneath the icy dignity of the Wise 
Man. Both had Platonic affmities and even roots in the notion of the 
superiority of the philosophical to the practical life. Worse still, by for-
getting or despising politics, philosophy itself was in danger of decaying. 
Both Epicureanism and Stoicism held that the quest for wisdom had been 
transformed into Wisdom, that philosophy was essentially complete in 
their respective systems. Cicero devoted many of his philosophical 
works to disabusing these schools of their pretensions to Wisdom. But 
his political works serve the same purpose: philosophy will be revived 
when it returns to its roots in the opinions of men, when it reminds itself 
of what it does not know about the human and divine things, when it 
becomes political philosophy. 
Having compared Cicero's position to Plato's and Aristotle's in gen-
eral terms, let me say something more specific about Cicero's doctrine of 
natural law. 
In its broadest rather than highest significance, the effect of the natu-
ral law on the gentleman, its relevance to everyday moral life, becomes 
visible most clearly in the De Officiis, meant to be the most popular or 
accessible of Cicero's political books. It is here that Cicero speaks of the 
'natural law' in his own name. The theme of the book, of course, is the 
seeming conflict between the noble (honestum) and the useful (uti/is), or 
between virtue and expediency. In its extreme form - its most interest-
ing form - that conflict is over the magnanimous man's attitude towards 
glory. For from magnanimity may spring "all too easily the excessive 
and pertinacious lust for pre-eminence (cupiditas principatus) ". Cicero 
makes clear that he speaks popularly and somewhat loosely in this book, 
so the magnanimity of which he warns is not the highest or true magnan-
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imity; it is the magnanimity that is the close companion of physical cour-
age and of glory in war - the virtue at which the entire Roman people, 
he says, excel (7). In the grip of such magnanimity, the ambitious gentle-
man lusts to be the first man (princeps) of the regime, even to be the sole 
ruler. On fire with this desire for a certain kind of excellence, he finds it 
more and more difficult to preserve that equity or equality (aequitatem) 
which is appropriate in the highest sense to justice: he strives to be 
superior through force rather than equal through justice (8). 
The problem with the Aristotelian reliance on gentlemanly virtues, 
especially the singular virtue of magnanimity, is that it makes gentlemen 
too prideful, too vain. Cicero does not dispute the existence, the worth, 
or the importance of genuine magnanimity; indeed, he lauds it in the 
character of Scipio. But he finds that too many who are unfit aspire to be 
magnanimous, or rather aspire to enjoy the honors that are due the mag-
nanimous man. To put it bluntly, this desire for glory is too easily per-
verted into Caesarism. And so Cicero tries to redefine gentlemanship or 
the public understanding of gentlemanship in terms of duty. To help the 
many imperfect gentlemen who are torn between the expediency of quick 
and unjust glory and the nobility of virtue that is sought for its own sake, 
Cicero proposes to lay down some 'formula' to decide hard cases: mag-
nanimity enriched with doctrines (magnanimitas uberior doctrina). This 
formula or rule is natural law, which assimilates the magnanimity of the 
gentleman to the true magnanimity of the Wise Man. As a result, the 
traditional account of morality in terms of virtues is given a new twist, in 
which justice may be said to impose a law on magnanimity and the other 
virtues. These virtues are now seen not simply or primarily as comple-
tions or excellences of the human soul, but also as obligations or duties 
commanded by nature. 
It is to Cicero that we owe the first, or at any rate the most enduring, 
treatment of duties (officia) as a major and compelling theme of political 
philosophy. From the point of view of the natural law, the moral virtues 
are not simply good for their own sake but are also duties authorized and 
commanded by something higher. Virtuous actions are done for the sake 
of the noble, but the noble is a kind of participation in the eternal, in the 
things that are. Through the natural law, morality becomes a duty to 
nature and, in a way, to the quest for knowledge of nature, to philosophy. 
Consequently, morality becomes more philosophical, and philosophy be-
comes more moral. Political science ceases to be particularly addressed 
to founders or to potential founders and legislators, and becomes more 
(7) De Officiis 1, 61. 
(8) De Officiis I, 64. 
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open to the instruction of the young (contra Aristotle) and of men general-
ly in their duties as human beings and citizens (not in the problematics of 
virtue, contra Plato). With the elaboration of the idea of conscience, 
already present in Cicero, gentlemanship becomes in some sense demo-
cratized; and the idea of the equality of men under the law of nature 
receives its first glimmerings of significance. At the same time, Cicero's 
invocations of the Stoic idea of the Wise Man tend to democratize every-
one, including philosophers (who are only seekers of wisdom); for meas-
ured against the Wise Man's perfect wisdom, everyone falls short and is in 
need of external moral guidance - the sort provided, at least in part, by 
natural law. 
It was left to America to realize the promise of this inchoate appre-
ciation of equality by becoming the first nation in history explicitly to 
base itself on natural law - to dedicate itself to the proposition "that all 
men are created equal". This is Cicero's great and enduring legacy to 
America, a legacy whose moral significance is rediscovered whenever, in 
moments of national crisis, from the Civil War to the civil rights struggle 
of the 20th century, Americans listen again to the better angels 1 of their 
nature. 
